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Case Notes

Punitive Damages: An Exception to the Right of Privacy?
Coy v. Superior Court

For many years California has allowed the admission of evidence concerning the wealth of defendants in civil cases where
punitive damages were in issue. Such information has been
compelled in discovery proceedings by the California Supreme
Court. In Coy v. Superior Court,1 an action for abuse of process, the plaintiff sought compensatory punitive damages. The
defendants refused to respond to interrogatories requesting information concerning their personal assets. The trial court denied a motion to order further response, thus resulting in the
instant case, a proceeding to review, by writ of mandate, the
denial of that motion. The supreme court, in holding that disclosure of a defendant's wealth could, in fact, be compelled
where punitive damages were in issue, emphasized that such
information is both admissible at trial as well as being proper
2
material for pretrial discovery.
Punitive damages are authorized in California by statute 3 and
evidence of a defendant's wealth has long been held a proper
factor in determining the actual amount of such damages. A
plethora of judicial decisions, beginning with Barkley v. Cope1. 58 Cal. 2d 210, 373 P. 2d 457, 23 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1962).
2. 58 Cal. 2d at 223, 373 P. 2d at 463, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
3. "In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or
implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages
for the sake of an example and by way of punishing the defendant." CAL. CIv.
CODE § 3294 (West 1970).

land in 1887, has firmly established this rule in California. 4
Although California has uniformly followed this rule, other
jurisdictions have rejected it in whole or in part. The rationale
of the earlier cases rejecting this point of view was characterized primarily by a distaste for the very concept of punitive
damages.
There can be no reason why twelve men wholly irresponsible should
be allowed to go beyond the issue between the parties litigating, and
after indemnifying the plaintiff for the injury sustained by him proceed as conservators of the public morals to punish the defendant in a
private action for an offense against society. If the jury have the right
to impose a fine by way of example, the plaintiff has no possible claim
to it, nor ought the
court to interfere and set it aside, however exces5
sive it might be.
To measure punitive or exemplary damages by the wealth of the
defendant seems far fetched. As well might the state impose a fine
in a
6
criminal case in accordance with a defendant's ability to pay.

Subsequent New York cases have produced varied results,
some admitting such evidence,7 others rejecting the requirements of such disclosure. 8 Rather than examining specific factors, those courts rejecting such disclosures have done so
primarily due to their disdain for the imposition of punitive
damages in general.9 To bar such disclosures, recent cases have
focused on such rights of the defendant as that of privacy. 10 In
each of these cases the court has upheld an admission of the
defendant's financial status as relevant to the setting of punitive
damages, but has required such disclosure only after the return

of a special verdict awarding punitive damages. Only then was
the information admissible to facilitate the jury's setting the
amount of damages. The courts have enunciated two purposes
for preferring this bifurcated trial procedure. The first, and
probably most significant, is the protection of the defendant's
right of privacy:
It is unthinkable that a court should sanction such broad and unlimited search and report of a defendant's personal holdings on the mere
4. Barkley v. Copeland, 74 Cal. 1, 15 P. 307 (1881), Greenberg v. Western
Turf Assn., 140 Cal. 357, 73 P. 1050 (1903), Marriott v. Williams, 152 Cal. 705, 93 P.
875 (1908); see also, 27 A.L.R. 3d 1377.
5. Dain v. Wycoff, 7 N.Y. 191, 193 (1852).
6. Brown v. Smallwood, 83 N.Y.S. 415, 419 (1903).
7. Fry v. Bennett, 1 Abb. Pr. 289 (N.Y. 1855), Klauber v. S.K.E. Operating
Co., Ltd., 296 N.Y.S. 701 (Super. Ct. 1937), 1 CLARK: NEW YORK LAW OF DAMAGES §
54.
8. Brown v. Smallwood, 83 N.Y.S. 415 (1903), Wilson v. Onandaga Radio
Broadcasting Corp., 23 N.Y.S. 2d 654 (1940); Austin v. Bacon, 3 N.Y.S. 587 (1888).
9. See notes 5, 6 supra.
10. Rupert v. Sellers, 368 N.Y.S. 2d 904 (1975), Vollertsen Associates v.
Nothnagle, 369 N.Y.S. 2d 267 (1975), and Gierman v. Toman, 77 N.J. Super. 18,
185 A. 2d 241 (1962), a New Jersey case based on Klauber, supra note 7.
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basis of demand of punitive damages. .

.

. The concept of the right of

1
privacy in our society rises higher than the needs of this plaintiff. '

The second, related more to the assurance of a fair and equitable trial, stems from a fear that the defendant's financial status
might have a prejudicial effect on the jury, thereby inducing
verdicts based on spurious or perhaps emotional responses
rather than on the relevant facts of the case. Keeping such
knowledge from the jury until such time as it has a need to know
should preclude this occurrence.
Defendant's worth should not be a weapon to be used by plaintiff to
enable him to induce the jury to find the defendant guilty of malice
thus entitling plaintiff to punitive damages. To avoid such abuse we
conclude that the split trial procedure should be used...11

Conducting the trial in this manner will therefore preclude the
plaintiff from forcing public disclosure of the defendant's personal affairs to his possible disadvantage. This is true whether
the disadvantage is one of privacy or one of fairness.
Subsequent to the Coy decision several changes occurred in
the law relating to privacy. The California Constitution was
amended in 1974 making privacy an "inalienable right.' 13 The
right of privacy, first so named by Warren and Brandeis in the
Harvard Law Review, has subsequently been ". . . recognized
and enforced in California and in most states throughout the
country.' 1 4 Prosser has described four distinct ways in which
this right is invaded: an appropriation of one's name or likeness,
an intrusion upon one's physical seclusion, a placing of one in a
false light in the public eye, and a public disclosure of private
facts, that with which Coy deals. 15 This aspect of the right deals
with public disclosure of admittedly accurate private information, which, although not actionable as defamation, has nevertheless been held to constitute an impermissible and actionable invasion of privacy. 16 The rationale for such an action
11. Gierman v. Toman, 77 N.J. Super. 18, 22, 185 A. 2d 241, 245 (1962).
12. Rupert v. Sellers, 368 N.Y.S. 2d 904 (1975).
13. CAL. CONST. art. 1 §1: All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy.
14. See also, PROSSER, TORTS 802 (4th ed. 1971); and Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.
App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
15. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
16. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 867 (1927) dealing with disclosure of financial matters: nonpayment of a debt.

is that a definite injury is produced when one's personal affairs
are aired to the public regardless of the accuracy of the information. Each person has a right to protect certain aspects of his
affairs from public scrutiny. A breach of this protection has
been recognized as actionable unless perpetrated by the state.
In 1965 the United States Supreme Court elevated the right of
privacy to a constitutional level. In Griswold v. Connecticut,7
the Court, basing its decision on the penumbral right of privacy
derived from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, held a Connecticut statute proscribing the use of birth
control material as unconstitutional. Privacy, whose invasion
had theretofore been recognized only as a tort, 8 and only alluded to in a constitutional sense, 19 had finally become a fully
protected constitutional right. Griswold and its progeny thus
mandate that the state may no more deprive its citizens of privacy without due process of law than may an individual.
The exercise of this right has also been applied to the disclosure of private financial affairs. In City of Carmel-by-the-Seav.
Young, the California Supreme Court applied the principles of
Griswold to the state ordered disclosure of personal financial
affairs of public employees. 20 The California legislature enacted
legislation intended to disclose any actual or potential conflicts
of interest regarding public officials and candidates for public
office. This series of statutes 2' required disclosure by such persons of information concerning all investments owned by themselves, their spouses or minor children that exceeded $10,000.
An exception existed for personally used homes or recreational
properties. Faced with mass resignation by its public officials,
the plaintiff city filed for declaratory relief. Although the trial
court upheld the statutes, the supreme court reversed, holding
the statutes to be ". . . an overbroad intrusion into the right of
privacy .
"...,,22
The court's analysis recognized three major
factors: the interest of the state in revealing conflict of interest
in public officials, the right of the individual to seek and hold
public office and the right of the individual to protect his private
affairs from public disclosure. In its discussion of the last factor, the court stated that:
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. See note 15 supra.
19. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,656 (1961) creating a "right to privacy, no less
important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P. 2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
21. CAL. GOVT. CODE §§3600-3704 (West 1972).

22. 2 Cal. 3d at 262; 466 P.2d at 227; 85 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
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• . .the right of privacy concerns one's feelings and one's own peace
of mind (citation. omitted) and certainly one's personal financial affairs are an essential element of such peace of mind. . . .In any event
we are satisfied that the protection of one's personal financial affairs
• . .against compulsory public disclosure is an asepct of the zone of
privacy which is protected by the Fourth Amendment and which also
falls within the penumbra of constitutional rights into which the government may not intrude absent a showing
of compelling need and
23
that the intrusion is not overly broad.

In its balance of the three competing interests, the court found
the value of privacy to weigh heavily. Despite the strong state
interest in having honest and credible public officials in government, the court, for constitutional reasons, decided in favor of
individual privacy. The court leaves little doubt that it considers
privacy with respect to one's personal financial matters to be a
"fundamental right," a basic value "implicit in the concept of
'25
ordered liberty, '24 and among "basic civil rights of man.

Reconsidered in light of this subsequent law, can Coy maintain its viability or is it a likely subject for reevaluation in this
sensitive area of law? Whatever the trend, it is clear that the
wealth of the defendant cannot be compelled in an action for
compensatory damages alone:
[I]t has been the theory of our government and a cardinal principle of
our jurisprudence, that the rich and poor stand alike in courts of
justice, and that neither the wealth of the one nor the poverty of the
other shall be permitted to affect the administration of the law. Evidence of the wealth of a party is never admissible, directly or otherwise, unless in those exceptional cases where position or wealth is
necessarily involved in determining the damages sustained. 26 In our
opinion the pretrial disclosure of such financial information would be
contrary to the public interest and would not be consistent with the
policy of the. . . .to hold otherwise would open a Pandora's Box...27

In considering punitive damages, however, there is a strong
legal policy to make the responsibility appropriate to the circumstances of the individual to be burdened:
The object of exemplary damages is to make the punishment fit the
offense (Thomson v. Catalina, 205 Cal. 402, 405-406, 271 P. 198 (62
A.L.R. 235), and in determining the amount necessary to impose the
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
198, 201

Id. at 268, 466 P. 2d at 231, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N.Y. 73, 103, 52 N.E. 679, 690 (1899).
Doak v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 825, 832, 838, 65 Cal. Rptr. 193,
(1968).

appropriate punitive effect
the jury was entitled to consider the
28
wealth of the defendant.

The policy of punishing the wrongdoer has, in the past, been
balanced against the right of the defendant and found not violative of his constitutional rights.29 With the "fundamental rights"
concept, however, a much more rigorous standard is demanded,
as in Carmel where the necessity of showing both a compelling
need and absence of overbreadth are prerequisites when attempting to abridge these rights.30 In applying these criteria to
Coy, the issues can be narrowed to two: is the disclosure of the
defendant's wealth necessary to accomplish the legitimate objectives of the courts, and, is the disclosure requirement, as
applied in California, drawn with sufficient precision and specificity so as to restrict the right of privacy only to such a degree
as necessary to accomplish a legitimate end?
A majority of jurisdictions recognize and accept the rationale
for punitive damages, that of punishing persons who have committed wrongful acts with malicious intent. 31 The question of
specificity, however, is another matter. Under Coy, disclosure
can be compelled by simply pleading a prima facie case for
punitive damages with no factual evaluation or judgement of
any kind being required. If the jury finds unanimously for the
defendant, his full financial status has already been made public in the absence of any fault other than the passive act of being
named a defendant! It seems unlikely that such an arbitrary
invasion of privacy would be upheld today in view of the
amendment of Article 1, section 1 of the California Consitution,
Griswold, its progeny and especially Carmel:
the state must establish the unavailability of less offensive alternatives and demonstrate that the conditions are drawn with narrow
specificity, restricting the exercise of constitutional rights only to the
32
extent necessary ....

Griswold and Carmel require a compelling need to justify an
invasion of privacy by the state. Whether the courts will find
punitive damages in a civil lawsuit between private citizens a
compelling state interest is a question yet to be resolved. Unquestionably the state has some interest in punishing malicious
acts beyond the actual damage inflicted, but that interest may
not reach the degree of importance necessary to take prece28. Mac Donald v. Joslyn, 275 Cal. App. 2d 282, 293, 79 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1969),
as cited in, Wetherbee v. United Insurance Co. of America, 18 Cal. App. 3d 266,
270, 271, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678, 681 (1971).
29. 23 CAL. JUR. 3d Damages § 116 (1975).
30. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 268, 466 P. 2d. 225, 230, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1970).
31. 23 CAL JUR. 3d Damages §116 (1975).
32. 2 Cal. 3d at 265, 466 P. 2d at 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
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dence over a fundamental right. Even if such an interest were
found, disclosure based on mere allegation is more than is required to satisfy the goal of appropriateness of punishment.
The bifurcated trial concept offers an attractive alternative.
This approach, adopted in several cases hereinbefore cited,33
advantageously graduates the penalty in accordance with the
burden it places on the defendant, and yet, at the same time
protects the defendant's privacy until such time he has been
found liable. In operation, the jury is sent out to consider the
question of whether punitive damages should be awarded. If
they return with a special verdict to the effect that such damages are appropriate, only then is evidence of defendant's
wealth admissible. Although this procedure results in some delay and inconvenience, such drawbacks must be weighed
against the protection of a right of constitutional magnitude. It
is doubtful that a court would hold such inconvenience as outweighing the right of privacy. Were a case like Coy to be decided in the future, the California Supreme Court would do well
to reverse the Coy approach and adopt the bifurcated trial
concept. Perhaps this issue, with its fundamental implications,
should be resolved by the legislature rather than waiting for a
court decision. A statute which would bar the disclosure of
personal financial information until after an award of punitive
damages has been made would mandate a bifurcated trial procedure and thus protect the defendant from an unnecessary
invasion of his privacy where punitive damages are alleged.

RICHARD

33. See note 10, supra.
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